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# UNSC

The Red Sea and Horn of Africa Maritime Crisis

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## EFFLMUN'25

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UNSC

STUDY GUIDE

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## **1.Letters from the Secretariat**

Dear delegates,

A warm welcome to EFFLMUN'25. We are truly delighted that you have chosen to spend your time with us, and we aim to make this decision one you'll look back on with absolute satisfaction.

This conference has been crafted with careful thought and unwavering dedication. I feel incredibly fortunate to have a role in shaping this event and to work alongside such talented individuals. The process demanded commitment, yet every step was rewarding because we always believed in the value of what we were building.

EFFLMUN'25 represents so much determination, passion, patience, and countless moments of collaboration that cannot be summed up easily. Above all, it was created to leave you with lasting, meaningful memories.

With great enthusiasm, we come together once more to celebrate dialogue, leadership, and the spirit of democracy. We cannot wait to offer you an exceptional and inspiring experience.

Güneş Uzun  
Secretary-General  
[guneuzn@gmail.com](mailto:guneuzn@gmail.com)

Dear delegates,

We made the EFFLMUN'25 with you in our hearts. We are happy that you joined us. Much thought and energy went into creating this gathering — but most importantly, it started with one idea: talking deeply always links people in unique manners. You picked to stay these days by our side; thus for every bit of time spent getting ready, it is valuable.

EFFLMUN'25 is far greater than the timetable of committees and sessions. It is a space where ideas converge, perspectives widen, and acquaintances happen to strike up. We wish that you are able to muster up enough confidence to speak out your thoughts, interest to look around, and ease just having fun being here.

As this conference kicks off, we want you to feel welcomed and supported as well as encouraged to take hold of any opportunity that comes your way. We are eager to see your drive, your leadership, and the individual marks each of you will make.

Ahmet Furkan Elden  
Director General  
[afurkaneld@gmail.com](mailto:afurkaneld@gmail.com)

## **2.Letters from the Academic Team**

Dear Delegates,

It is our pleasure to welcome you to the conference. As the Academic Team, we have worked with great care to research, write and organise every topic you will see throughout this event. Our goal was to create material that is clear, reliable, informative, and inspires you to debate with confidence.

We believe MUN is at its best when delegates feel prepared, supported and their visions expanded. That's why we focused on building committees that not only tackle global issues but also spark curiosity and encourage deeper thinking. We hope our work helps you dive into your roles, challenge ideas, and enjoy the experience fully. If you have any questions before or during the conference, our team will be glad to assist you. We wish you meaningful discussions, bold diplomacy, and an unforgettable MUN experience.

The Academic Team

## **3.Letters from the Chairboard**

Dear Delegates,

I am Aylin Okur, I will be your Under Secretary General and President Chair for UNSC. I am currently an 11th grader studying at Gelisim Schools. This will be my 13th experience and It is my utmost pleasure to welcome you to our committee. Whether this is your first conference or one of many, I hope this experience challenges you, inspires you, and allows you to grow both as a MUNer and as a person. Model United Nations thrives on curiosity, preparation, and empathy, three values I am confident each of you will bring to the table

I cannot wait to meet you all at EFFLMUN'25 ! I look forward to getting to know every one of you throughout the conference. In the meantime, if you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to reach out. See you soon!

Sincerely,

Aylin Okur- Under Secretary General, President Chair

[okuraylin@gmail.com](mailto:okuraylin@gmail.com)

Firstly, I would like to say that it is a great pleasure to serve as your Vice-Chair. I welcome you all to the United Nations Security Council Committee at EFFLMUN'25, and I hope we will have a productive session filled with meaningful debates.

Throughout the sessions, I encourage you to approach the discussions with empathy, creativity, and respect. Let us not only debate but also collaborate to find meaningful solutions.

I cannot wait to meet you and look forward to spending these three days together with passion, motivation, and teamwork. Also, if you have any questions, do not hesitate to reach out.

Sincerely,  
Ömer Tuna Meşe - Vice Chair  
[omertnameşe@gmail.com](mailto:omertnameşe@gmail.com)

## **4. Introduction**

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been mandated to uphold its primary responsibility for protection of International Peace and Security and collective security. Such has also been highlighted under Article 1 of the UN Charter. The Security Council is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations established as a result of the aftermath of World War II.

### **4.1. Overview of the Agenda Item and Its Global Relevance**

The Red Sea and The Horn of Africa forms one of the most strategically important regions in the world. The area encompasses the Middle East, Gulf of Aden, Suez Canal and a significant part of Africa, eventually fresheting into the Indian Ocean; handling about 15% of global shipping traffic and 33% of international container traffic. The region's significance extends beyond commerce: it also functions as a bridge between Africa, Asia and Europe, making it a focal point for economic competition, military presence and political influence.

The backdrop of the discussion is a region in flux. The peace and security landscape of the region is shifting, driven by a number of factors, including technological advancements, demographic shifts, economic stress, and climatic disruptions. These forces have placed states under tremendous pressure, manifesting in increasingly transactional state behavior and opening the door for external actors, including private enterprises, criminal networks, superpowers, and middle powers. These threats endanger freedom of navigation, undermine regional development and have global ripple effects on supply chains, energy markets, and humanitarian access. The crisis serves as an example of how local conflicts can have disproportionate consequences worldwide when they happen in globally connected spaces.

Maintaining the security of important trade routes, upholding the sovereignty of littoral states, and tackling the socioeconomic and humanitarian issues that contribute to maritime insecurity present a challenge for the international community.

### **4.2. Significance of Maritime Security in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa**

Maritime security in this region is not a simple regional concern but a global necessity. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a vital point between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn Of Africa; closure or disruption of this passage forces vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks of travel and significantly increasing fuel and insurance costs. Such disruptions translate directly into higher prices for food, oil and manufactured goods.

Beyond commerce, the Red Sea's stability affects humanitarian operations. Ports such as Djibouti and Aden are essential entry points for food aid into Yemen, Ethiopia and Sudan , countries that already face severe humanitarian crises. Meanwhile, the Horn of Africa's fragile governance structures make coastal zones vulnerable to criminal activity, illegal fishing, arms smuggling and human trafficking.

Therefore, maritime security here must be viewed through a multidimensional lens: military protection of shipping lanes, legal enforcement of maritime laws and socioeconomic development that reduces incentives for piracy and insurgency.

## **5. Background of the Crisis**

### **2.1. The Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea**

The Houthi Attacks are a direct reason why we call the situation in the Red Sea a "crisis". To be able to give an explanation to the attacks, it is crucial to understand their motives; The Houthis , officially known as Ansar Allah, are an Islamist political and military organization that emerged from Yemen in the 1990s. They are backed by Iran, being widely considered part of the Iranian-led "Axis of Resistance"

## Incidents off the coast of Yemen



Source: Ambrey Analytics

On the 19th of October 2023, Houthis began firing missiles and armed drones at merchant vessels which they perceived to be linked with Israel, since then they have seized and launched aerial attacks against dozens of merchant and naval vessels in the Red Sea. While they have declared these attacks as part of a campaign of solidarity with Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, some examples complicate their aim. Their ability to strike at sea shows not only their growing technological capability but also the regional scale of Yemen's war, in which Iran, Saudi Arabia and Western powers are directly involved.

The attacks led to the formation of different regional defensive naval missions, including the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian and the European Union-led Operation Aspides. The presence of Western navies has been instrumental in certain areas, such as intercepting Houthi weapons, escorting some merchant vessels, and salvaging stricken ships. The Poseidon Archer military strikes, conducted in "self-defense" by the United States and Great Britain with nonoperational support from other countries, were also necessary to target Houthi weapons stocks and launching sites. While the operations have helped reduce attacks to an extent, they have not yet been able to deter the group. It also raised concerns on escalation and harm to civilians within Yemen.


On May 6, 2025, a ceasefire deal between the United States and the Houthi movement in Yemen, brokered by Oman, took hold, ending the March–May 2025 United States attacks in Yemen, as well as the wider US–UK airstrikes on Yemen since the beginning of the Red Sea crisis. The Houthis agreed to halt their attacks on U.S. vessels but otherwise would continue their attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and emphasized that the ceasefire did not in "any way, shape, or form" apply to Israel, which had begun launching its own strikes on Yemen. Despite this cease-fire agreement which intended to make the trade lanes safer, the largest commercial shipping companies continue to avoid the Red Sea and Suez Canal.

## 2.2. The Resurgence of Somali Piracy

There are many reasons why Somali Piracy has made a comeback; but before the whys, looking at the background gives a good headstart.

In the early 1980s, The Somali Ministry of Fisheries and the Coastal Development Agency (CDA) launched a development program which also received significant foreign investment funds, as the Somali fishing industry was considered to have a lot of potential owing to its unexploited marine stocks. The government at this time permitted foreign fishing.

After the collapse of the central government in the ensuing civil war, the Somali Navy disbanded in 1990–1991. With Somali territorial waters undefended, foreign fishing trawlers began illegally fishing on the Somali seaboard and ships began dumping industrial and other waste off the Somali coast. This led to erosion of the fish stock and local fishermen started to band together to try to protect their resources.



From 2008 to 2012, Somali pirates skyrocketed in activity, capturing global attention by hijacking hundreds of ships, holding crews for ransom and disrupting trade. There were as many as 200 piracy incidents reported annually between '08 to '12. Shippers were forced to hire guards and take longer routes to avoid the Horn of Africa waters. Fuel bills soared, as did insurance premiums and labour costs. A World Bank estimate indicated piracy in 2010 cost

the global economy \$18 billion. The U.S., European Union, and NATO deployed ships to patrol the waters off the Somali coast as part of a coordinated international response, while local Somali administrations also mobilised to root out the pirates, incidents significantly decreased as a result especially after 2015. Recent reports, however, point to a concerning resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean, as of late 2023.

To summarize, piracy emerged as a result of Somalia's political instability and inadequate coastal governance, encouraged by the economic effects of climate change, overfishing by foreign fleets, and unemployment in coastal communities, most recently, redirection of naval resources to combat Houthi Attacks have created patrol coverage gaps which allowed criminal networks to function with little hindrance.

Even though there are currently fewer incidents than there were in the early 2010s, the trend shows that maritime patrols by themselves cannot end piracy in the absence of sustainable development and governance onshore. It also emphasizes how intertwined Red Sea security is, as Yemeni crises have the potential to subtly rekindle criminal activity throughout the region.

### **2.3.Strategic importance of the Region Competition**

The Red Sea area consists of about 20 countries from Africa and the Middle East. Even so, researches suggest this area is the World's fastest growing economy and its resources are used up the least. According to calculations done by the UN, it is thought that for the 35 years ahead of us the area's population will go up by more than 2 times, showing an increase from 620 million to 1.3 billion. In the same calculations, it is stated that the Red sea ports will show successful rates in terms of an economically developed population and outlook, with a big move in urbanization.

As of today the countries which are considered part of the Red Sea area make up about 9% of the World total trade and 13% of the whole trade goes through the Red Sea. Petroleum business between European countries, Atlantic territory and Middle Eastern states being carried through the Canal plays a big role in the zone's importance as well. In addition, exports from Asia-Pacific countries, particularly China, Japan and India, to Europe and the Atlantic Region are also facilitated via the Red Sea route. Considering that the Red Sea is also an important tourist center, the vessel traffic in this region can be easily calculated. According to the EIA's 2016 statistics, the amount of crude oil and refined petroleum products passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait into the Red Sea is 4.8 million barrels per day. This rate represents a significant increase over five years compared to the 3.3 million barrels of oil transported in 2011.

In this context, the strategic value of the Gulf of Aden-Bab el-Mandeb connection is evident. Given that the Red Sea is of such critical importance to global energy markets and world trade, and its importance is obvious to both the actors located in the region and the global

actors who are “obligated to” take a close interest in the region, Some political developments in the Red Sea region also need to be evaluated in relation to this waterway.

And so, The Horn of Africa is attracting heightened interest from the United States, Türkiye, European and Gulf countries. It can be detected in the growing number of military bases, economic investments, infrastructure projects and maritime security initiatives in the region. Political relations fluctuate between cooperation and competition. Some countries, especially in the Gulf, view the Horn as an extension of their security perimeter, while others see it as a battleground for regional rivalries, particularly between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as between Gulf states and Iran.

Faced with this increasingly crowded arena, the United Nations has to decide how to navigate this complex interplay of international, regional and national interests. Three potential postures emerge: damage control, competition for influence or a quest for cooperation.

The Red Sea itself has become a stage for intensified strategic competition. China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti, joining the United States, France, Japan, and other countries that already operate significant military facilities there. Russia has pursued agreements for naval access in Sudan, while Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar continue to invest heavily in port development, logistics corridors, and economic footholds across the Horn of Africa.

This overlapping presence reflects both commercial ambitions and security calculations. Control over the Red Sea confers influence over global energy routes, the Suez Canal, and access to African markets. However, it also heightens tensions: rival states sometimes pursue competing alliances with fragile governments in the Horn, potentially fueling instability.

The region’s strategic geography thus amplifies even small-scale conflicts. A local militia’s attack or an act of piracy can quickly trigger international naval responses or diplomatic friction among great powers seeking to assert their interests.

## **6. Past International Actions**


### **6.1. United Nations Resolutions and Naval Operations**

The United Nations Security Council resolutions 1816, 1846, 1851 and subsequent renewals authorized international forces to enter Somali territorial waters to combat piracy. These resolutions established the legal framework for states to share information and conduct cooperative naval patrols.

In order to coordinate military, legal and capacity building responses, more than 60 nations and organizations joined the UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), which was founded in 2009. Through direct action and deterrence, parallel operations like Combined Task Force 151, NATO Ocean Shield and EU NAVFOR Atalanta significantly reduced piracy.

## Strategic footprints

Navigating a crowded space



The Security Council has emphasized adherence to international law, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and denounced attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. However, divisions among permanent members over the conflict in Yemen have limited the adoption of new binding resolutions addressing Houthi attacks specifically.

## **6.2. Efforts Made by Regional Organizations and Major Powers**

The African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have promoted regional maritime strategies aimed at enhancing coast-guard capacity, legal frameworks, and information sharing. The Djibouti Code of Conduct (2009, revised 2017) under the International Maritime Organization (IMO) provides a cooperative mechanism for states in the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden to coordinate against piracy and other illicit maritime activity.

Major powers have also maintained naval deployments in the region. The United States and United Kingdom currently lead operations to deter Houthi attacks; the European Union has launched Operation Aspides, focused on defensive escorts; and India, China, and Japan continue anti-piracy patrols under independent command. Although these efforts demonstrate broad international concern, coordination among them remains inconsistent due to differing mandates and political interests.

## **7.Current Challenges**

### **7.1. Escalating Security Threats and Their Impact on Trade**

Maritime routes in the Red Sea and across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait are currently subject to elevated risk, primarily due to hostile actions by Houthi forces and piracy issues. For this reason roughly 80% of container vessels were rerouted from the Suez / Bab el-Mandeb route to go around the Cape of Good Hope. Transiting around the Cape of Good Hope adds millions of dollars in increased fuel costs and up to 17 days of additional transit time. For everyday consumers, these invisible disruptions become higher fuel prices, delayed electronics, more expensive food, and reduced availability of essential goods. For shipping companies, the calculation is brutal: higher insurance premiums, more fuel consumption, and greater stress on already stretched global supply chains. Mentioning insurance costs (“war risk” premiums) for vessels transiting the region, the growth of such premiums reflects not only increased risk but also uncertainty around future attacks and the capacity of maritime actors to deter or respond.

For countries bordering the Red Sea especially Djibouti, Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen instability is even more damaging. Ports lose traffic, revenue, and foreign investment. Egypt’s Suez Canal, a key source of national income, experiences downturns when ships are diverted. Yemen’s already fragile humanitarian operations slow down or halt entirely when aid vessels decide the risk is too great.

#### **7.1.1. Balancing Military Intervention with Humanitarian Needs**

While naval escorts and deterrence missions are designed to secure shipping lanes, their effects routinely intersect with humanitarian realities onshore, especially in Yemen, where an estimated 19.5 million people required assistance in 2025. Military activity around key ports has already had measurable consequences: operations at the

port of Hodeidah reportedly fell to about 25% of normal capacity after strikes damaged tugboats and port infrastructure, constraining the flow of food, fuel, and medical supplies into a country overwhelmingly dependent on maritime imports. At the same time, humanitarian partners recorded 1,331 access and security incidents in 2024, including movement restrictions, delays, and threats to personnel; factors that disrupt relief supply chains even when sea corridors remain partially open.

But naval interventions have stabilized the situation even by a tad, by mid-2025, Red Sea traffic had recovered to approximately 36–37 ships per day, and multinational escort missions reported the safe transit of hundreds to over a thousand vessels, though still below pre-crisis benchmarks. However, these operational gains do not automatically translate into improved humanitarian conditions, as reduced port capacities and onshore insecurity continue to limit the delivery and distribution of aid. The evidence demonstrates that maritime security and humanitarian access cannot be treated as separate tracks: effective crisis management requires narrowly targeted military measures that avoid damaging critical port infrastructure, consistent de-confliction mechanisms with relief agencies, and explicit safeguards ensuring that security operations do not inadvertently restrict the movement of humanitarian cargo or personnel.

But while ensuring these conditions, countries have to be aware about the usage of their forces, a small move benefiting them may cost the worlds. From a legal perspective, the use of force at sea raises complex issues. While states and coalitions have justifications (e.g., self-defense, right to protect navigation), such operations must remain compliant with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principles of distinction and proportionality under international humanitarian law. There is also the risk of escalation: maritime operations may draw in other states, intensify regional rivalries, and complicate any political settlement onshore.

Moreover, secular coordination remains difficult. Even when international coalitions carry out escorts or defensive operations, ensuring the safe passage of civilian and humanitarian vessels without exacerbating the conflict is a persistent challenge.

### **7.1.2.Coordination Gaps between Regional and Global Actors**

One thing the region lacks is a unified response towards the crisis. In order to ensure peace and consistency within the zone, states and regional organizations must agree on a common ground. However, The Red Sea territory, Horn of Africa and related countries altogether are a bundle of overlapping naval missions, capacity constraints, structural gaps and miscommunications.

Despite many overlapping efforts, there is significant fragmentation: different navies and organizations operate under separate command structures, mandates, and objectives, which makes it difficult to form a coherent strategy. For example, the

European Union's Atalanta mission coordinates with other naval operations such as EUNAVFOR Aspidos and Combined Maritime Forces, yet information sharing can be constrained by differing rules and levels of classification.

On the African side, there is also a structural gap in maritime governance. Many coastal states do not yet have fully developed national maritime strategies or dedicated maritime strategy institutions, reducing their ability to engage in coordinated security planning or share critical maritime domain awareness (MDA) data. Despite the existence of regional frameworks such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) and its Jeddah Amendment, formal cooperation has often lagged: only recently has the EU gained "observer" status, signaling support but also reflecting limited integration so far.

Another big player in the game; Capacity constraints. According to African security analyses, many states bordering the Red Sea have limited surveillance infrastructure, few trained personnel, and insufficient technological resources to fully monitor their waters. Meanwhile, some regional maritime coordination centers do exist (for example, in the Western Indian Ocean), but equivalent capacity in the Red Sea bordering African states remains very weak.

These dynamics undermine the potential for a truly integrated maritime security architecture. Without stronger institutional mechanisms, clearer lines of communication, and greater investment in maritime-domain awareness infrastructure, the region will remain vulnerable, not only to external threats but also to inconsistent or duplicative responses that fail to address root causes.

## **8. Bloc Positions**

### **8.1. Perspectives of Major Powers and Organizations**

#### **8.1.1. African Union (AU)**

The African Union prioritizes political and diplomatic solutions over military interventions. It stresses preventive diplomacy, mediation, and dialogue as the main tools to address ongoing armed conflicts and humanitarian crises in Africa. AU also emphasizes the necessity of predictable and sustainable financing for AU-led peace support operations, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023). The AU seeks to maintain African-led solutions to African problems, advocating for coordination with the UN while ensuring that African perspectives and sovereignty remain central to decision-making.

#### **8.1.2. United Nations**

The United Nations sees its partnership with the African Union as essential for promoting lasting peace, security, and development across Africa. The UN strongly supports AU-led peace support operations and calls for predictable, sustained funding in line with Security Council Resolution 2719, so that these missions can operate

without sudden shortfalls. It favors political solutions — such as preventive diplomacy, mediation, and dialogue — over purely military responses to conflict, believing these to be crucial both for reducing humanitarian suffering and building long-term stability. At the same time, the UN argues for reform of the global financial architecture: it insists that African nations need fairer access to development finance, and that debt burdens must be addressed more equitably. The UN also prioritizes climate action, viewing climate resilience as deeply tied to peace, and emphasizes inclusive participation in peace processes: youth and women must be more fully involved.

### **8.1.3. European Union**

The European Union supports a deep and sustained multilateral partnership with the African Union. It strongly condemns violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, and calls for an immediate ceasefire in conflict-affected states, accompanied by inclusive political dialogue to achieve a sustainable peace. The EU advocates for reliable financing of AU-led peace operations, endorsing the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2719 to ensure case-by-case, yet consistent support. On the development front, the EU aligns its strategy with both Africa's *Agenda 2063* and the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (2030 Agenda), pushing also for the full implementation of the "Sevilla Commitment" to mobilize investments, reduce debt burdens, and reform development finance. Moreover, the EU stresses the urgency of climate action — particularly for the most vulnerable African populations — and pledges to increase the role of women's leadership in peacebuilding as a core part of its approach.

### **8.1.4. G77/China**

The G77+China bloc believes that there is a need for strong regional cooperation to manage the maritime crisis in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. The bloc draws attention to the importance of keeping trade routes safe, as these are critical for both local and global economies. It urges all countries in the region, especially smaller and developing states, to have an involvement in planning and decision-making. G77+China supports sharing knowledge and resources, such as monitoring systems and anti-piracy measures, to improve maritime security. The group also emphasizes protecting people affected by the crisis, including refugees and those forced to move because of conflict at sea. By promoting fair and cooperative solutions, G77+China has goals to reduce risks, prevent further instability, and respect the sovereignty and development needs of all nations in the region.

### **8.1.5. Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (P5)**

The P5 countries include the United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China, which prominently influence and are key to maintaining

international security and stability for all nations around the world. Their influence or presence in the Horn of Africa or the Red Sea region is widely recognized because of their ability to enact sanctions, maintain security through peace-keeping missions, and implement foreign diplomacy initiatives. The five countries have strategies toward regional situations to maintain stability while also promoting their geopolitical concerns and meet their strategic national security objectives. Their positions may differ at some stages of strategy formulation, especially for the use or management of resources, military strategies for intervention, or foreign investment assistance but all favor having threats alleviated to avoid any insecurity for international business routes or stability.

#### **8.1.6. League of Arab States**

The Arab League is significant because it represents Arab countries located within North and East Africa as well as the Middle East. The League focuses on Arab unity, politics, and preventing conflicts. Within the region of East Africa and the Red Sea region, the Arab League promotes activities for stabilizing interborder conflicts, ensuring marine security, and fostering economic cooperation among its member states. Although its power is strategically linked to politics, the Arab League promotes cooperation among its member states for humanitarian relief, development, and environmental conservation efforts for shared regional objectives. It also follows activities that may have impacts on the whole Arab region regarding security for marine routes and climate-related threats.

### **8.2.Role of International and Regional Organizations**

International and regional organizations play an active role and should continue to do so in managing crises in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa regions. Their main responsibilities include promoting peace and security, facilitating communication between parties, and providing coordinated assistance to populations affected by crises. Global actors, such as the United Nations, oversee the implementation of international law and support sustainable development programs in the region. Regional organizations, for example IGAD, facilitate cooperation among member states on cross-border conflicts and regional threats. These organizations provide technical and financial support while also encouraging joint planning and capacity building. Through early warning systems and crisis management programs, regional and international actors make cooperation concrete and implement awareness-raising policies to address insecurity in the region.

## **9. Questions to Ponder**

1. What role can the UNSC play in creating effective deterrence strategies towards non-state actors , like the Houthis and Somalian Pirates, to ensure lasting peace and safe maritime routes ?
2. How can member states and international organizations work together towards sealing coordination gaps, in order for a truly integrated maritime security architecture?
3. In what ways can coastal states strengthen port infrastructure, maritime governance and monitoring capacities to alleviate piracy and unregulated maritime activity?
4. How can emerging technologies, such as maritime surveillance systems, drones, and satellite monitoring, be leveraged to improve security and early warning in the territory?
5. In what ways can international law and UNSC resolutions be strengthened to hold states and non-state actors accountable for maritime violations?
6. How can the UNSC promote long term regional cooperation and conflict prevention strategies ?
7. How can military interventions be designed to protect trade routes while minimizing harm to humanitarian operations?

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